



UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

Commissioner for Patents
United States Patent and Trademark Office
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, VA 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov

Paper No. None

DILLON & YUDELL LLP
8911 NORTH CAPITAL OF TEXAS HWY
SUITE 2110
AUSTIN TX 78759

COPY MAILED

APR 20 2005

OFFICE OF PETITIONS

In re Application of	:	
Hideto Horikoshi et al.	:	
Application No. 09/625,762	:	DECISION ON PETITION
Filed: July 26, 2000	:	
Attorney Docket No.: JA919990082US1	:	
Title: METHOD AND COMPUTER FOR	:	
REMOTE COMMUNICATION WHILE	:	
OPERATING IN A POWER-SAVING	:	
MODE	:	

This is a decision on the petition filed October 5, 2004, under 37 C.F.R. §1.137(a)¹, to revive the above-identified application.

The above-identified application became abandoned for failure to reply within the meaning of 37 CFR §1.113 in a timely manner to the final Office action mailed October 23, 2003, which set a shortened statutory period for reply of three (3) months. On November 3, 2003, an amendment was received, and on April 29, 2004, an advisory action was mailed which indicated that the amendment failed to place the application in condition for allowance. Accordingly, the above-identified application became abandoned on April 24, 2004. On May 17, 2004, an Appeal Brief was received, and on May 27, 2004, a Notice of Appeal was filed. On July 26, 2004, a second Notice of Appeal was filed. On September 28, 2004, a Notice of Abandonment was mailed.

With the instant petition, Petitioner has submitted the petition fee and a statement of facts.

¹ A grantable petition pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(a) must be accompanied by:

- (1) The reply required to the outstanding Office action or notice, unless previously filed;
- (2) The petition fee as set forth in § 1.17(l);
- (3) A showing to the Commissioner that the entire delay in filing the required reply from the due date for the reply until the filing of a grantable petition was unavoidable;
- (4) Any terminal disclaimer (and fee as set forth in § 1.20(d)) required pursuant to paragraph (d) of this section.

Petitioner has met requirements (1) and (2) above. The fees associated with the filing of a Notice of Appeal and an Appeal Brief have been charged to Petitioner's Deposit Account, as authorized in the respective filings. The fourth requirement is not applicable.

As to item (3), the showing of record is not sufficient to establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that the delay was unavoidable within the meaning of 37 CFR 1.137(a).

The Commissioner is responsible for determining the standard for unavoidable delay and for applying that standard.

"In the specialized field of patent law, . . . the Commissioner of Patent and Trademarks is primarily responsible for the application and enforcement of the various narrow and technical statutory and regulatory provisions. The Commissioner's interpretation of those provisions is entitled to considerable deference."²

"[T]he Commissioner's discretion cannot remain wholly uncontrolled, if the facts **clearly** demonstrate that the applicant's delay in prosecuting the application was unavoidable, and that the Commissioner's adverse determination lacked **any** basis in reason or common sense."³

"The court's review of a Commissioner's decision is 'limited, however, to a determination of whether the agency finding was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.'"⁴

"The scope of review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency."⁵

The standard

"[T]he question of whether an applicant's delay in prosecuting an application was unavoidable must be decided on a case-by-case basis, taking all of the facts and circumstances into account."⁶ The general question asked by the Office is: "Did petitioner act as a reasonable and prudent person in relation to his most important business?"⁷

² Rydeen v. Quigg, 748 F.Supp. 900, 904, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1876 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd without opinion (Rule 36), 937 F.2d 623 (Fed. Cir.1991) (citing Morganroth v. Quigg, 885 F.2d 843, 848, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg 849 F.2d 1422, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("an agency's interpretation of a statute it administers is entitled to deference"); see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defence Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 81 L. Ed. 694, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984) ("if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.")

³ Commissariat A L'Energie Atomique et al. v. Watson, 274 F.2d 594, 597, 124 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 126 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (emphasis added).

⁴ Haines v. Quigg, 673 F. Supp. 314, 316, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1130 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (citing Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 93 S. Ct.1241, 1244 (1973) (citing 5 U.S.C. 706 (2)(A)); Beerly v. Dept. of Treasury, 768 F.2d 942, 945 (7th Cir. 1985); Smith v. Mossinghoff, 217 U.S. App. D.C. 27, 671 F.2d 533, 538 (D.C. Cir.1982)).

⁵ Ray v. Lehman, 55 F.3d 606, 608, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1786 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 77 L.Ed.2d 443, 103 S. Ct. 2856 (1983)).

⁶ Id.

⁷ See In re Mattulah, 38 App. D.C. 497 (D.C. Cir. 1912).

Nonawareness of a PTO rule will not constitute unavoidable delay.⁸ The burden of showing the cause of the delay is on the person seeking to revive the application.⁹

A delay caused by an applicant's lack of knowledge or improper application of the patent statute, rules of practice, or the MPEP is not rendered "unavoidable" due to either the applicant's reliance upon oral advice from USPTO employees or the USPTO's failure to advise the applicant to take corrective action.¹⁰

The word 'unavoidable' . . . is applicable to ordinary human affairs, and requires no more or greater care or diligence than is generally used and observed by prudent and careful men in relation to their most important business. It permits them in the exercise of this care to rely upon the ordinary and trustworthy agencies of mail and telegraph, worthy and reliable employees, and such other means and instrumentalities as are usually employed in such important business. If unexpectedly, or through the unforeseen fault or imperfection of these agencies and instrumentalities, there occurs a failure, it may properly be said to be unavoidable, all other conditions of promptness in its rectification being present.¹¹

A petition cannot be granted where a petitioner has failed to meet his or her burden of establishing that the delay was "unavoidable."¹²

The portions of the CFR and the MPEP relevant to the abandonment of this application

37 CFR § 1.116 Amendments after final action or appeal.

- (a) An amendment after final action or appeal must comply with § 1.114 or this section.
- (b) After a final rejection or other final action (§ 1.113) in an application or in an ex parte reexamination filed under § 1.510, or an action closing prosecution (§1.949) in an inter partes reexamination filed under § 1.913, amendments may be made canceling claims or complying with any requirement of form expressly set forth in a previous Office action. Amendments presenting rejected claims in better form for consideration on appeal may be admitted. The admission of, or refusal to admit, any amendment after a final rejection, a final action, an action closing prosecution, or any related proceedings will not operate to relieve the application or patent under reexamination from its condition as subject to appeal or to save the application from abandonment under § 1.135, or the reexamination from termination. No amendment can be made in an inter partes reexamination proceeding after the right of appeal notice under § 1.953 except as provided for in paragraph (d) of this section.

⁸ See *Smith v. Mossinghoff*, 671 F.2d 533, 538, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 977 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (citing *Potter v. Dann*, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 574 (D.D.C. 1978) for the proposition that counsel's nonawareness of PTO rules does not constitute "unavoidable" delay)). Although court decisions have only addressed the issue of lack of knowledge of an attorney, there is no reason to expect a different result due to lack of knowledge on the part of a pro se (one who prosecutes on his own) applicant. It would be inequitable for a court to determine that a client who spends his hard earned money on an attorney who happens not to know a specific rule should be held to a higher standard than a pro se applicant who makes (or is forced to make) the decision to file the application without the assistance of counsel.

⁹ *Id.*

¹⁰ See *In re Sivertz*, 227 USPQ 255, 256 (Comm'r Pat. 1985).

¹¹ *In re Mattullath*, 38 App. D.C. at (1912)(quoting *Ex parte Pratt*, 1887 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 31, 32-33 (1887)); see also *Winkler v. Ladd*, 221 F. Supp. 550, 552, 138 USPQ 666, 167-68 (D.D.C. 1963), *aff'd*, 143 USPQ 172 (D.C. Cir. 1963); *Ex parte Henrich*, 1913 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 139, 141 (1913).

¹² *Haines*, 673 F. Supp. at 314, 316-17; 5 USPQ2d at 1131-32.

- (c) If amendments touching the merits of the application or patent under reexamination are presented after final rejection, or after appeal has been taken, or when such amendment might not otherwise be proper, they may be admitted upon a showing of good and sufficient reasons why they are necessary and were not earlier presented.
- (d) No amendment can be made as a matter of right in appealed cases. After decision on appeal, amendments can only be made as provided in §§ 1.198 and 1.981, or to carry into effect a recommendation under § 1.196 or § 1.977.

[24 FR 10332, Dec. 22, 1959; 46 FR 29183, May 29, 1981; para. (a) revised, 62 FR 53131, Oct. 10, 1997, effective Dec. 1, 1997; revised, 65 FR 14865, Mar. 20, 2000, effective May 29, 2000 (adopted as final, 65 FR 50092, Aug. 16, 2000); paras. (b) and (d) revised, 65 FR 76756, Dec. 7, 2000, effective Feb. 5, 2001]

37 C.F.R. § 1.134: Time period for reply to an Office action.

An Office action will notify the applicant of any non-statutory or shortened statutory time period set for reply to an Office action. Unless the applicant is notified in writing that a reply is required in less than six months, a maximum period of six months is allowed.

[47 FR 41276, Sept. 17, 1982, effective Oct. 1, 1982; revised, 62 FR 53131, Oct. 10, 1997, effective Dec. 1, 1997]

37 CFR §1.135: Abandonment for failure to reply within time period.

- (a) If an applicant of a patent application fails to reply within the time period provided under § 1.134 and § 1.136, the application will become abandoned unless an Office action indicates otherwise.
- (b) Prosecution of an application to save it from abandonment pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section must include such complete and proper reply as the condition of the application may require. The admission of, or refusal to admit, any amendment after final rejection or any amendment not responsive to the last action, or any related proceedings, will not operate to save the application from abandonment.
- (c) When reply by the applicant is a bona fide attempt to advance the application to final action, and is substantially a complete reply to the non-final Office action, but consideration of some matter or compliance with some requirement has been inadvertently omitted, applicant may be given a new time period for reply under § 1.134 to supply the omission.

MPEP706.07(f), Time for Reply to Final Rejection, sets forth in part:

The time for reply to a final rejection is as follows:

(A) All final rejections setting a 3-month shortened statutory period (SSP) for reply should contain one of form paragraphs 7.39, 7.40, 7.40.01, 7.41, 7.41.03, or 7.42.09 advising applicant that if the reply is filed within 2 months of the date of the final Office action, the shortened statutory period will expire at 3 months from the date of the final rejection or on the date the advisory action is mailed, whichever is later. Thus, a variable reply period will be established. In no event can the statutory period for reply expire later than 6 months from the date of the final rejection.

Application of the standard to the current facts and circumstances

On October 23, 2003, a final rejection was mailed. On November 3, 2003, an amendment was received, and on April 29, 2004, an advisory action was mailed. Petitioner asserts that the abandonment was unavoidable since more than 6 months passed between the mailing of the final rejection and his receipt of the advisory action.

This argument is not persuasive.

It is clear from rules 37 C.F.R. §§1.116 and 1.135 that abandonment of an application is risked when the applicant proffers an amendment after the mailing of a final Office action. The rule clearly indicates that the mere filing of an amendment does not relieve applicant of the duty to take appropriate action to save the application from abandonment.

If steps are not taken after final to maintain pendency prior to the expiration of the maximum extendable period for reply, the application will go abandoned. Put another way, the submission of an after final amendment which fails to place the application in condition for allowance will result in the abandonment of the application, unless one of the following four items is filed prior to the maximum extendable period for reply:

- a subsequent amendment which places the application in condition for allowance;
- a Notice of Appeal;
- a Request for a Continuation Application pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 1.53(b), if applicable;
- a Request for Continued Examination pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §1.114, and;
- a Terminal Disclaimer, if applicable.

Petitioner did not submit the required reply to the Final office action prior to the expiration of the maximum extendable period for response. The Final office action was mailed on October 23, 2003. The submission of November 3, 2003 failed to place the application in condition for allowance. No further submissions were received prior to the expiration of the maximum extendable period of time for response, and as such, the application went abandoned.

For this reason, Petitioner is not able to characterize the abandonment as “unavoidable.”

It follows that this petition must be **DISMISSED**.

Any request for a renewed petition under 37 C.F.R. §1.137(a) must be submitted within **TWO (2) MONTHS** from the mail date of this decision. Extensions of time under 37 CFR 1.136(a) are permitted. The response should include a cover letter entitled “Renewed Petition Under 37 CFR 1.137(a) *(or §1.137(b), if applicable)*”. This is not a final agency action within the meaning of 5 U.S.C 704.

Petitioner may also wish to consider filing a petition to revive based on unintentional abandonment under 37 CFR 1.137(b)¹³.

The renewed petition should display “Please deliver to Paul Shanoski, c/o Office of Petitions” in a prominent manner.

To help assure prompt and proper attention to your response, please see Request for Alert Concerning Submitted Petitions, 1282 Official Gazette (May 18, 2004) for further information on how to assist the Office in delivering your submission to the correct location. The Petitioner

¹³ A grantable petition pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(b) must be accompanied by:

- (1) The reply required to the outstanding Office action or notice, unless previously filed;
- (2) The petition fee as set forth in § 1.17(m);
- (3) A statement that the entire delay in filing the required reply from the due date for the reply until the filing of a grantable petition pursuant to this paragraph was unintentional. The Commissioner may require additional information where there is a question whether the delay was unintentional, and;
- (4) Any terminal disclaimer (and fee as set forth in § 1.20(d)) required pursuant to paragraph (d) of this section.

may wish to consider telephoning the undersigned one month after the submission is made to confirm that the documents were properly delivered.

Any renewed petition may be submitted by mail¹⁴, hand-delivery¹⁵, or facsimile¹⁶.

The application file will be retained in the Office of Petitions for two (2) months.

Telephone inquiries regarding this decision should be directed to the undersigned at (571) 272-3225. All other inquiries concerning examination procedures or status of the application should be directed to the Technology Center.



Paul Shanowski
Senior Attorney
Office of Petitions
United States Patent and Trademark Office

¹⁴ Mail Stop Petition, Commissioner for Patents, United States Patent and Trademark Office, P.O. Box 1450, Alexandria, VA, 22313-1450.

¹⁵ Customer Window, Randolph Building, 401 Dulany Street, Alexandria, VA, 22314.

¹⁶ (703) 872-9306 - please note this is a central facsimile number, and as such, there will be a delay in the delivery of the facsimile to the undersigned, which could be as much as one month.